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Fairness and Siting:
Introduction to a Symposium
Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer & Ragnar E. Lifstedt*
In 1995, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in
Laxenburg, Austria, sponsored a meeting to examine the underlying
causes for a hazardous waste siting impasse in the U.S. and Europe and
to suggest ways of designing procedures and outcomes that command
wide support. The papers in the present symposium reflect ideas
originally aired at that meeting.
Siting hazardous waste disposal facilities is a major policy problem
throughout the industrialized world. For example, in 1981, the
Environmental Protection Agency predicted that the U.S. would need
close to a hundred new off-site facilities. Despite extensive and costly
efforts in most states, there exists today only one new hazardous waste
land disposal facility (in Last Chance, Colorado) and fewer than ten
new hazardous waste treatment and incinerator units.' A similar
siting impasse exists for nuclear waste facilities. Despite legislation
requiring states to build low-level nuclear waste facilities by this year,
only one has been built and a handful approved. 2 After twenty years
of efforts for a high level nuclear waste facility, large uncertainties still
exist concerning the acceptability - technical and social - of the
3
Yucca Mountain site in Nevada.
Siting hazardous toxic or nuclear waste facilities rarely happens,
anywhere. Few social problems have proven as intractable in so many
countries. Protests have disrupted attempts to site nuclear facilities
throughout Europe; it cannot claim more progress than the U.S. on
siting toxic or high level nuclear waste facilities. 4 Also, in Asia, where
*
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organized civil disobedience is less common, villagers in Taiwan, the
Philippines, Korea, India and even Japan have taken to the streets to
protest waste sites.
Failure to find sites for toxic and nuclear waste, however, does not
inevitably mean that the process is a failure. As Michael Thompson
points out, "unsiteability" can generate opportunities in the form of
other locations, new technologies for dealing with wastes and improved
waste reduction. Siting out of the country, as Lawrence Summers once
argued, may be seen as an efficient win-win strategy for both exporters
and importers. 5 Yet, waste shipments to poor countries evokes moral
indignation and has led to an enhanced sense of responsibility by waste
generators and probably to increased waste reduction.
A siting process is a failure if the default option for current or future
wastes is keeping them in substandard facilities that pose unacceptable
risks to the public and the environment. Once a social consensus on the
need for facilities is established, and this is often contentious, then the
siting problem becomes fundamentally one of allocating the facility
burden. With imagination, a wealth of options present themselves, from
imposing the burden on the technically most qualified community to
recruiting qualified volunteer communities based on bids for
compensation, or even using lotteries. The facility burden might also be
shared by locating many smaller facilities or rotating responsibility.
The question is how to divide and allocate the social burden,
however perceived, from hazardous wastes. Precedents may be helpful,
and social burden sharing is commonplace. The tax burden is usually
shared progressively; jury duty is allocated by random selection; and
schemes for military recruitment range from universal service, lotteries,
6
to professional service using voluntary, market mechanisms.
However, even with many historical precedents for sharing social
burdens, it is striking that after many years and many books, a
reasonable burden-sharing scheme for existing hazardous wastes has not
been forthcoming. If anything, problems have become more acute.
4 Ray Kemp, The Politics of Radioactive Waste Disposal (1992).
5 Lawrence Summers, Why the Rich Should Pollute the Poor, The Guardian, Feb.
2, 1992, at 8.
6 H. Peyton Young, Equity in Theory and Practice (1994).
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Howard Kunreuther, Paul Slovic and Donald MacGregor attribute
this institutional failure, in part, to the erosion of trust in government
and industry and to varied perceptions of the risks of toxic and nuclear
waste. Trust and risk perception are, in their view, closely linked and
related to social relationships and to ways different people view the
world. Interestingly, in their empirical research, well-educated white
males (who usually propose and build waste facilities) stand out as
perceiving the world

-

and wastes

-

as less risky than everyone else.

If trust is the key, why after so many years of siting legislation and
siting experience has no country been able to design procedures that
promote the requisite trust? Benjamin Davy argues that any siting
outcome will be unjust or unfair to somebody, and this "essential
injustice" will undermine trust in the proposers. He points to three
competing notions of justice observed in siting processes: utilitarian
justice which provides for the least unhappiness or least risk (i.e., the
technically best site); libertarian justice with minimal state imposition
and with competitive interactions (i.e., the voluntary, market approach)
and Rawlsian or egalitarian justice that allows inequality only if it is
beneficial to the least advantaged.
These three notions of justice, as Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer and
Kevin Fitzgerald argue, offer the key to understanding the impasse. A
utilitarian notion of justice, where sites are imposed, is unacceptable to
individualists who view it as too authoritarian. Yet, the libertarian/
individualistic paradigm, where communities are given the right of
consent and encouraged to bargain for compensation, is sharply
criticized by egalitarians who rightly note that such procedures
inevitably put facilities in poor communities. Anna Vari, as well as
Linnerooth-Bayer and Fitzgerald, shows that the public holds these
different views of what is fair. The key to resolving the impasse, in their
view, is to design procedures and outcomes that appeal to conflicting
ideas of fairness. Although stakeholders in a siting battle usually agree
on very little, they do appear to agree on one important concept: The
burdens of waste should be borne by those responsible for generation.
Rather than emphasizing responsibility or civic duty, the current
trend is promoting voluntary approaches that appeal to self interest, i.e.
compensation. However, voluntary market approaches have had little
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success. Anna Vari documents public opposition in New York and
Hungary, where people view offers of compensation, e.g., as bribes.
If public opposition prevents choices made by government decree or
entrepreneurial bargaining, some type of negotiated settlement is called
for. A novel form of negotiation has been developed in Germany by
Ortwin Renn and his colleagues, where experts provide evidence on the
need for waste facilities and their technical qualifications to a randomly
selected citizens' committee that supplies the value judgments necessary
for the siting decision. This process has succeeded in Switzerland and is
now being applied to the challenge of designing a hazardous waste plan
in the German Black Forest.
Finally, Ragnar Lfstedt discusses a different type of siting
problem, that of an existing Swedish nuclear power plant located very
close to Copenhagen. In this transboundary setting, issues of risk
perception, communication, trust and responsibility take on additional
complexity. What responsibility does a country have to its neighbors?
Surprisingly, the Danish and Swedish public appear to understand the
problem from the view of their counterparts. In Denmark, for instance,
there is a strong support for a solution in which Sweden closes the plant
and Denmark reduces its export of acid rain. Again, taking
responsibility for one's own pollution appears to be a fundamental
notion of a fair outcome.
There is no recipe for successfully siting - or successfully not siting
a hazardous waste facility, but the authors in this volume identify
some of the critical ingredients. A facility should certainly not be sited
if it is not needed, or if it is not perceived as acceptably safe. Even a
facility for which a consensus exists that it is needed will not be
"siteable" if a process is not in place that is viewed as fair and
trustworthy. Since the public holds different and conflicting notions of
what is fair, it will be necessary to negotiate a process design that
appeals to all or most of the interested parties. The notion of "taking
responsibility for ones own wastes," whether by the individual
generator, a region or a country, appears to be an important element of
a fair outcome.

